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1. Introduction 
The Theory of Implementation studies the feasibility of achieving social goals 
when taking properly into account agents' incentives, i.e. the possibility of 
reconciliating utopia and self-interested behavior. Usually, an agent's behavior is 
modeled according to sorne game-theoretical concept which is suited to an 
informational framework. Social goals are described by a mapping, called Social 
Choice Correspondence (SCC in the seque!), which associates to each environment 
in a certain class a set of feasible altematives. This set is interpreted as the socially 
optimal altematives for a given environment. A Mechanism (sometimes called a 
Game Form) is a description of the language in which agents cornmunicate and the 
consequences of the messages (strategies) they send. A mechanism is said to 
implement a given SCC if, for any environment in the domain of this correspon-
dence, there are equilibrium messages (in sorne game-theoretical sense) and the 
consequences of these messages coincide with the altemative prescribed by the 
SCc. 
Most papers in Implementation Theory assume that the designer knows the 
equilibrium concept, i.e. how agents behave. The purpose of this paper is to 
investigate the consequences of assuming that the mechanism should work, at least 
partially, regardless of the structure of information in the environment and 
therefore, it should implement the SCC for two equilibrium concepts rather than 
for a single one. The idea behind this, is that when designing a mechanism, the 
planner. does not know the structure of information. Therefore the mechanism 
should be robust to the different possibilities that might arise. In this sense, our 
paper is akin to the workon Double Implementation which requires a mechanism 
to implement a given SCC in both Nash and Strong equilibria (see Maskin (1979 
and 1985), Schmeidler (1980), Corchon-Wilkie (1991), Tadenuma-Thomson 
(1993) and Suh (1993)) or in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria (see Jackson 
(1989), Jackson-Palfrey-Srivastava (1990) and Yamato (1991a)). Our concept.of 
Robust Implementation is conceived in the same spirit, but applied to the problem 
of information. We require a mechanism to implement a SCC under two different 
informational structures: ignorance and risk. Therefore, we might say that our 
mechanism doubly implements a SCC but keeping in mind that in our case the 
different equilibrium concepts refer to different informational set-ups. 
A typical result in the Theory of Implementation says that, given a kind of 
rational behavior (implied by the structure of information), sorne SCC can or can 
not be implemented in a certain range of environments. Thus, if agents use 
dominant strategies, implementation of acceptable SCC is essentially impossible if 
the domain of SCC is large enough (Hurwicz (1972), Gibbard (1973), Satterth-
waite (1975), see also Ledyard-Roberts (1974)). However, implementation of 
acceptable SCC is possible, under certain conditions, if the equilibrium concept is 
Nash (Maskin (1977), see also Repullo (1987)). Moreover these conditions can be 
adapted to the case in which agents are assumed to be Bayesian (see Postlewaite-
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Schmeidler (1986), Palfrey-Srivastava (1989) and Jackson (1991)). AH these 
results suggest a trade-off between the information possessed by an agent about 
other agents - none in the case of dominant strategies, a common prior in the 
Bayesian framework and complete information in the case of Nash - and the 
possibility of implementing a satisfactory SCC. 
In this paper we will consider the implementation problem when the informa-
tion possessed by agents is variable. In order to give structure to the problem we 
will make an additional· assumption: throughout the paper we will assume that 
agents have complete information about a part of the environment. In other words, 
the environment is composed of islands, with a population of at least three agents 
each. Every agent has complete knowledge about the preferences of other people 
on the same island. This fact is also common knowledge to the agents and the 
designer. Examples of islands inelude families, groups of friends, firms in the 
same industry, individuals in a task force, departments in a university, etc. With 
respect to the information about the rest of the environment, we will assume two 
different settings. 
1. Ignorance. Agents only know the set of possible types of agents outside their 
islands, as opposed to their actual types. Moreover, priors on types are meaning-
less. In this framework, the equilibrium strategy for an agent must be the best 
reply to what the rest of the agents on the island play, and to any possible message 
sent by agents outside her island when they foHow their equilibrium strategies. 
The last requirement resembles dominant strategies, the difference being that a 
strategy is dominant if it is a best reply regardless of how other players behave, 
and in our case, the strategy must be a best reply no matter what other players 
(outside the island) are like. This equilibrium concept has been used in the 
literatUTe (without OUT assumption about islands) under the name of Uniform Nash 
Equilibrium (see d'Aspremont-Gerard-Varet (1979) and Matsushima (1988». 
2. Risk. In this framework, OUT equilibrium concept is the usual Bayesian 
Equilibrium introduced by Harsanyi (1967), with the aforementioned condition 
that players have complete information inside islands. The difference here from 
the usual notion of Bayesian implementation is that we assume that the designer 
does not know the exact prior. This implies that OUT mechanism implements a 
given SCC in Bayesian equilibrium for any possible prior. Thus the same 
mechanism implements under complete information, i.e. in Nash equilibrium. 
Therefore OUT results here are, in this sense, stronger than the standard results of 
Bayesian implementation. 
We define a mechanism as Robust relative to a SCC, if it implements tbis 
correspondence in Uniform Nash Equilibrium and Bayesian Equilibrium for any 
possible prior (i.e. with the designer being ignorant of the actual prior). Tbis 
notion attempts to capture the fact that the mechanism should be flexible enough 
to cope with different informational settings and that changes in the structure of 
information do not therefore imply a change in the mechanism. It must be 
remarked that OUT paper addresses a different problem from the one studied by 
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Saijo (1988) and McKelvey (1989). There, it was shown how the strategy space 
for Nash Implementation - under complete information - can be reduced. In 
contrast, we will consider implementation problems where agents only need to 
have complete information about their own island. A more satisfactory concept of 
robustness would allow for the possibility that islands might be populated by 
agents who have priors about sorne subset of agents outside the island and at the 
same time are ignorant about other agents outside the island. 
Our main result is that there is a Robust mechanism which implements any 
SCC satisfying the well-known conditions of Monotonicity and Non-Veto Power 
introduced by Maskin in the framework of Nash Implementation. 1 Thus, given 
our assumption about islands, the fact that information is or is not complete makes 
no essential difference from the point of view of Implementation. Therefore our 
results can be understood as a generalization of those obtained by Maskin under 
complete information. The cost of this generalization is the common knowledge 
assumption on islands. 
We remark that in this paper we do not identify. in general necessary and 
sufficient conditions for robust implementation. However, notice that since robust 
implementation implies Nash implementation all necessary conditions of the latter 
are necessary conditions of the former as well. In particular monotonicity or the 
conditions identified in Moore-Repullo (1990) as necessary conditions of Nash 
implementation are necessary conditions of robust implementation. Moreover, in 
economic environments, no veto power is vacuously satisfied and thus monotonic-
ity is a necessary and sufficient condition for robust implementation. 
An altemative motivation for our approach is that the theory of Nash implemen-
tation has been criticized for the following reason. On the one hand, the outcome 
function is not continuous on messages (at least when the general implementation 
problem is studied). On the other hand, exact complete information is required. 
Therefore a slight mistake in other people's characteristics might entail aItema-
tives far away from those selected by the SCC. Our mechanism however only 
requires exact complete information on a, usually small, subset of ag¡;nts. Thus, 
our mechanism can be regarded as introducing sorne robustness on Nash imple-
mentation. 
It should be remarked that the paper does not make any progress in other 
important topics such as the reduction of strategy spaces (even though our strategy 
spaces are not much larger than those in Williams (1986), Saijo (1988) and 
McKelvey (1989», the avoidance of modulo games (see Jackson (1988», the 
consideration of continuous and 'realistic' mechanisms and the possibility of 
agents forming coalitions or playing mixed strategies. A careful study of these 
points would obscure considerably the main concern of the model. 
1 11 is nol difficult lo show Ihal in our model -privale values and non-exclusive informalion-
monolonicily implies Bayesian monolonicily. 
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The rest of the paper goes as follows. The next section explains the basic model 
and our main assumptions. Section 3 is devoted to proving our results and, finally, 
section 4 gathers our conclusions together. 
2. Tbe model 
In this section Wi present our basic framework. Let N = {l, ... ,n} be the -
finite - set of agents. Let T¡ be the (finite but greater than one) set of attributes of 
player i and t¡ an element of T¡. We assume that t¡ embodies all relevant 
information about agent i. Let T = X¡"_¡ T¡ be the set of states. A state t E T 
provides a complete description of information and preferences of all agents. Let 
~ stand for the set of social aItematives and let .'7:T -+ ~ be the social choice 
correspondence (SCC in the sequeI). This mapping is assumed to embody the 
social objectives. 
We now describe the informational framework. We will assume throughout the 
paper that there is a partition of N, G = (G¡, ... ,Gs ) with # G¡ > 2,. i = 1, ... , s 
such that each agent in a given element of G has complete information about all 
the characteristics of any agent in this element of the partition, and this is common 
knowledge for all agents in the partition. Notice that this partition need not be 
unique. We may think of the environment as being composed of islands in the 
terminology introduced by Lucas (1972) (but notice that here, any island is 
composed of at least three agents). Therefore in our model information is not 
exclusive. Also, each agent is assumed to know the information contained in sets 
N, T, ~, and the SCC .'7. This information is assumed to be common knowledge. 
Let Gk be a typical element of G and i a typical element of Gk • Let t{i} be the 
information of i E Gk about the attributes of agents on her island, Le. t{¡} = 
{t¡, ... , tp ) where j, ... , pare all the agents in Gk • We write 1(¡} = 1] X ... X Tp • 
Also let us denote the attributes of all agents outside Gk by e{¡} and T _ti} = X¡~ G, 
Ij. We will say that t{¡} is the type of agent i. 
With respect to the information possessed by an agent about other islands, we 
will consider two set-ups. In the first one, agents will be assumed to act under 
ignorance, Le. they do not assign probabilities to the occurrence of states of the 
world (which are the types of agents living on other islands). In the second one, 
agents are considered to be Bayesian, Le. they assign probabilities to the states of 
the world. 
Each agent has a utility function u¡: ~ X T¡ -+ IR, Le. we assume private 
values (jt is not difficult to extend our results to Ihe case in which the utility 
function depends on the type of the agent). Let us denote by L(a, t) the elements 
of ~ which are not preferred to a E ~ according to the utility function u ¡( ,t), 
Le. the lower conlour sel of agent i relative to her utility function. Let us define 
a~{t)~.w' as the set of maximal elements of ~ according to u¡( ,t). It is 
assumed that this set is not empty for all possible attributes (see Jackson (1991) p. 
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469 and Palfrey-Srivastava (1991) p. 482 for a similar assumption). This assump-
tion holds if, for instance, preferences are continuous, and the feasible set is 
compact. 
We now define the strategic elements. A Mechanism (Game Form) is a pair 
(.L, g) where g:L ~ st' and L = X;"_ I.L¡. g is the outcome function and .L¡ is 
the message space of agent i. A strategy for agent i is a function Si: 1{i} ~.L¡. We 
write S as the vector of strategies for aH agents, i.e. S = (SI"'" sn)' Also 
S{i) = (si"'" Sp) is the tuple of strategies of aH agents inside Gk , and s_(iJ the 
tuple of strategies of aH agents outside Gk • 
In the first inforrnational setting, we assume that agents act in complete 
ignorance of the characteristics of any agent outside her group. Therefore each 
agent will play 'Nash' against agents within her group and uniform Nash against 
any agent outside her group. FormaHy 
Definition 1. S * = (s t , ... , s;) is a Uniform Nash Equilibrium with Complete 
Local Information for the state t = (tI, ... , tn ) if Vi = 1, ... , n 
ui( g( S{;) ( t{i)) ,s.:. {i)( t_{i))) ,ti) ;;:: U i( g( mi 'SI;}! i( t{i)) ,S':' {i)( t - {i}),ti), 
Vt_{i)ET_{il' VmiEMi· 
Notice that the equilibrium strategy of any agent must maximize her utility for 
any possible message recommended by the mapping S':' {i)(T -{i) for aH agents 
outside Gk • Let UNE (t,.L, g) be the set of Uniform Nash Equilibria with 
Complete Local Information (or Uniform Nash Equilibria for short) for the Game 
Form (L, g) when the state is t. 
Definition 2. (.L, g) implements the SCC g- in UNE if V tE T 
(a) Va Eg-(t), 3 s* E UNE (t, L, g) such that a = g(s*). 
(b) If S * E UNE (t, L, g) then g(s *) E g-(t}. 
We will say that g- is implementable in Uniform Nash Equilibrium if there is a 
mechanism implementing g- when agents behave according to Definition l. 
Our definition of a Uniform Nash equilibrium does not pay attention to the case 
in which agents have priors about the occurrence of states of the world. In order to 
deal with this case let us introduce a new informational setting. Agents have a 
common prior distribution p(t) which is assumed to be common knowledge. Let 
P be the set of alI adrnissible common prior distributions p on T. In order to keep 
matters simple, we will assume that either there is complete information or 
p(t) > O Vt E T. In accordance with the previous ideas, we can define the 
conditional probability distribution for agents on island Gk , q{i)(t-{i)1 t{i)' by 
p( t-!il' t{i)) 
q{i)(t-{i)1 t{i)) = ()' 
P{i) t{i) 
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where 
We also assume that agent i's preferences on risky outcomes can be repre-
sented by a von Neumann-Morgenstem utility function. 
Definition 3. s' == (st , ... , s;) is a Bayesian Equilibrium with Complete Local 
Information if, for a given state of the world t and common prior distribution p( . ) 
and for aH i E N, we have 
L q{;)( t_ (j)1 t{;))u;( g( s(7) ( tI;))' s~{;)( t_{;))), t;) ~ 
L{i}EL{i} 
L q{i)(c{;)lt{¡))u¡(g(m¡, s{;)\;(t{i))' s~{;)(t_{;))), ti)' 
t_{i}ET_{i) 
This is the usual definition of Bayesian equilibrium for the inf()rmation 
structure given aboye. Let B(L, g, p, t} be the set of Bayesian Equilibria with 
Complete Local Information (Bayesian Equilibrium for short) for the Game form 
(04, g) when the state of the world is t and the common prior C1istribution is p. 
We remind the reader that the standard Bayesian implementation approach 
assumes that the designer of the mechanism knows the common prior distribution. 
In our model, the center does not need to know p. However, it must knciw the 
partition G which seems to us to be a less demanding informational requirement, 
at least in sorne cases. 
Definition 4. The Game Form (L, g) implements the see g- in Bayesian 
Equilibrium with Complete Local Information if for aH tE T, pE P 
(1) Va E g-(t), 3s' E B(L, g, p, t} such that g(s') = a 
(2) If s' E B(L, g, p, t), then g(s' (t» E g-(t). 
Notice that the complete information model is a particular case of the Bayesian 
framework where q's are either zero or one. Thus, Bayesian implementation 
implies Nash implementation. FinaHy, we come to the main notion of the paper. 
Definition 5. Let g- be a Sec. The mechanism (L, g) is Robust relative to g- if 
it implements g- in Uniform Nash Equilibrium and Bayesian Equilibrium. 
The idea behind Definition 5 is that a mechanism is robust relative to g- (in 
short, robust) if it implements g- irrespective of the information on the environ-
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ment. Therefore the designer does not need to have much knowledge of the 
information that agents possess on the environment. Moreover, if agents acquire 
more information or change their priors, the proposed mechanism still implements 
7. 
Before we present our main result we will define two concepts which will play 
an important role in our paper. Botb are standard in the theory of Nash implemen-
tation. 
ASee 7 satisfies monotonicity if for all t, t' E T and a E7(t') we have 
L¡(a, t;) e L¡(a, t) for all i E N only if a E 7(t). 
ASee 7 satisfies no veto power if for all i E N, t E T and a E T and a E A 
we have L¡(a, ti) = A for aH j'" i only if a E g-(t). 
It should be pointed out that an implication of monotonicity is that if t '" t' but 
u i( ,t) = ui( ,t;) Vi, then g-(t) =7(t'). In this sense, the set of altematives 
recommended by 7 depends only on preferences and not on the information 
structure. Since Robust Implementation implies Nash implementation and mono-
tonicity is a necessary condition of Nash Implementation, it is also a necessary 
condition of Robust Implementation. Our main result is that monotonicity (plus no 
veto power) is sufficient for Robust Implementation. 
Theorem l. Any SCC which satisfies Monotonicity and No Veto Power can be 
implemented by a robust mechanism relative to 7. 
Firstly, we will present the mechanism. The next section will then be devoted 
to proving tbat this mechanism implements in Uniform Nash and Bayesian 
Equilibria any SCC satisfying monotonicity and no veto power. 
Let the message space for agent i be given by 
L¡ = 1(¡} X F X.w-X7(T) X 1\1 x.w-, 
wbere F is the set of aH selections of 7, 7(T) is the range of the SCC 7 and 1\1 
is the set of natural numbers. We write an element of L¡ in the following way 
Thus, tI will be the 'report' on agent j's attributes given by agent i. We will 
write (Ji) = (tI, tI,' . . tn, Le. t!i) is tbe information provided by i about the 
attributes of the people on her island. We now define the outcome function by way 
of the following three rules 
Rule l. If m = (mI"'" m.) is such that tI = tJ for all i, j E Gk and k = 1, ... , s, 
and there exists tE F such that ti = t for aH i, then g(m) = tUL ... , t;). 
Rule 2. There exists a uruque group k and there is a selection tE F such that for 
all Gm '" Gk we have t; = t; and fs = tr = t for aH s, rE Gm and for the group Gk 
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there exists a unique i E Gk such that <t1¡1, J¡) + (trl,~) with {tJi}, ~) = (tl¡l, fh) 
and ~ = f Vj, hE Gk , j, h + i. Then 
a¡, if a¡EL(c;. tn and c¡=f(tL ... ,t}, t/, ... ,t:), 
g(m) = where j E Gk 
f( t~, ... , t} ,t/, ... , t;), otherwise. 
Rule 3: If Rules 1 or 2 do not apply, then g(m) = b¡, where i = max {j:n j ~ n" 
for all s EN} 
When Rule 1 applies we say that there exists complete agreement on the 
reports. Whenever Rule 2 applies we say that there exists a unique disagreement 
and agent i is the dissident. If Rule 3 applies it is said that there are at least two 
dissidents. 
Rule 1 says that if there is total consistency on the reports on states and the 
selection of .'7, the mechanism chooses the alternative given by the selection f 
using the reported states. 
Rule 2 takes care of the case whereby all agents but one send consistent reports 
on states. In this case the mechanism will choose the alternative a ¡ given by the 
'dissident' whenever (1) c¡ coincides with the alternative recommended by the 
chosen selection f and the states reported by all other agents (2) this altemative 
belongs to the lower con tour set of c ¡ using the states reported by all other agents 
on i. If a¡ does not satisfy (1) and (2), the mechanism chooses the alternative 
recommended by the selection f when states are those reported by all agents but 
the 'dissident'. 
In all other cases, i.e. when there is more than one 'dissident' Rule 3 applies. 
These rules allow for some possible interpretation of a¡, c¡ and b¡ as a choice, a 
guess and a best alternative in ~ respectively. 
3. The proof of the theorem 
This section will be devoted to proving Theorem 1. We will divide the proof 
into two Propositions. These Propositions will show that the proposed mechanism 
implements a SCC in Bayesian and Uniform Nash Equilibria respectively. 
Proposition 1. 
If the Social Choice Function .'7 satisfies Monotonicity and No Veto Power, 
then the above Game Form (L, g) implements.'7 in Bayesian Equilibrium. 
Proof: We will present the proof for the case of p(t) > O Vt. The case of 
complete information is totally analogous and it is omitted. 
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(a) Firstly, we show that part 1 of Definition 4 is satisfied by (..1, g), i.e., 
Vt E T, Vp E P, and for any a Eg-(t) there exists s' E 8(..1, g, p, t) such that 
g(s' (t» = a. Choose any selection fE F such that ¡(t) = a and consider for any 
agent i the 'truth-telling' strategy s;' :1(jl --+..1 given by s;' (tUl) = (t{i» f, aj, e j, 
ni' b.) where aj, e j, nj' bj are arbilrary choices and t(j} is the tme type of agent i. 
We now show Ihat s' E 8(..1, g, p, t). lf all agents follow these strategies, Rule 
1 applies and the outcome is g(s' (t}) = f(t). Suppose Ihat agent i chooses 
m j = (tl jl, f:, dj, C;, n'j, b;) instead of s;' (tV})' with (t1'},J:) "* (twf ). Thus, Rule 2 
applies, and the outcome is either d j or fU). In both cases the outcome cannot be 
preferred to g( s * (t» 
(b) Secondly, we show that (..1, g) satisfies (2) in Definition 4. Now three 
cases must be considered. 
(j) g(s * (t» is given by Rule 1, i.e., s' (t) yields a complete agreement. In this 
case any agent i could have chosen a message m j = (tlj), f., aj' ej , ñj, h) instead 
of s;'~U}) = (t(j), fj, aj, e j, nj' b), where (IV), f)"* (l1'), f), aj EL (ej , tf), ñj = íi 
(s '), b j E a f1 (t.) and e j = N t • ), where t' are the reports on the states associated 
to s' (t) and ¡¡ (s' ) is a natural number greater than any number recommended by 
the equilibrium strategy for any agent and any state of the world (íi (s') is well 
defined because the finiteness of N and T). We want to know the reason why 
"agent i did not choose message m j" For all i _ U} such that s' (tw i _ U}) produces 
at least one dissident, the announcing of m j will take the mechanism to Rule 3 and 
the outcome will be g(s;'(t),m)Eaf1(1). For all the cases t'_(j} such that 
s * {t(i»t'- (jl) produces complete agreement, the announcing of m j yields the 
outcome g(s "-(j}(t'_ (j})' s(;}{t(jl» whenever ej "* Nt l , ••• , ti, ti, " .. , t;) where 
( 1 j ¡ n) th . d • ( , ). h tl"'"' ti' t¡, ... , t n are e report on types assocmte to s t_(j}, t(_j} , l.e. t e 
reports on types given by all agents but agent i, and a j whenever ej = Nt1, ... , ti, 
tf,."., t;). Thus, the reason for which she did not choose m j must be that 
This implication holds for all agents. Therefore by monotonicity of g- and 
since ej = ¡(t') for all i, then f(t·) E g-(t) and g(s' (t» E g-(t). 
(ji) g(s' (1» is given by Rule 2, i.e. g(s' (t» yields a unique dissident. Let 
agent i E Gk be the dissident. In this case, it is cIe~r that for aIl j E Gk,j"* i, we 
have g(s * SI) E af (~j)' To see this note !hat agent j can al~ays choose message 
- (- (j) - - -) (- (j) ) «j) ) (- (j) ) «j) ) m¡-.!¡ ,/¡,a¡,e¡,n¡,b¡ such that t¡ ,/¡ "* t j ,Jj, t¡ ,J¡ "* t¡ ,J¡, IEGk , 
1"* i, b¡ E af (t) and ñ¡ = íi(s'). By the choice of mi agent j takes the outcome 
from Rule 2 to Rule 3, and in this case she can get her best alternative. Now we 
show that the same must be true for agents outside Gk , i.e., g(s'(t» E a': (tu) 
Vu <t:. Gk • Take an agent U E Gr' Suppose that g(S*{t» <t:. a': (t '. Agent u could 
have chose~, instead of t~e message s; (t(u)) = (t~u), tu' au, eu, nu, bU>, the message 
mu = (t~.), fu, au, cu, ñu, bu} where {t~u}, fu}"* (t~u), fU>, au = cu, ñu = íi(s'} and 
hu E a': {tu}. For all e (u) such that s * (t(ul' t _ (Ul)' is given by rule 1, mu and 
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s; <tlu}) yield the same outcome. To see this, observe that for these cases, by the 
choice of muo agent u can force the mechanism to go to Rule 2 (and she becomes 
the dissident). Since au = Cu his dissidence is, however, a vacuous one. For aH 
t_ Iu} such that s'(tlu}, t_ Iu}) is given by Rules 2 or 3 message mu is such that 
g(S':'u{t), mu) is always given by Rule 3 and since ñu = fi(s') we have 
g(s; (t), mu) = bu E a': (tu)' Therefore for sorne t _ lu}' the message mu and s; (tlu}) 
yield the same outcome and for the rest of t_ Iu}' message mu yields an outcome 
which is strictly prefe"rred by agent u to the outcome achieved by announcing 
s; (tIU}) [observe that since we are in the case where g(s·(t» is given by Rule 2, 
there always exists such a C lu} for which mu is strictly preferred to s; J. Thus, 
regardless of the conditional probability function, mu is strictly preferred to 
s; {tIU})' which is a contradiction. Therefore, g(s' (t» E a':{tu) for aH u$: Gk • 
Thus, we have that g(s' (t» E af(t), Vj "" i, and by No Veto Power of 7 we 
have that g(s' (r» E 7(r). 
(üi) g(s' (t» is given by Rule 3, Le. there are at least two dissidents. IÍI this 
case it is c\ear that aH agents obtain the best outcome, Le., g(s' (t» E att<t). 
Then by No Veto Power of 7, g(s'(t» E,ST(t) .• 
Proposition 2. 
If the Social Choice Correspondence ,ST satisfies Monotonicity and No veto 
Power, then the above Game form (L, g) implements ,ST in Uniform Nash 
Equilibríum with Complete Local Informatíon. 
Proof. The first part of this Proposition (Le. Va E,ST(t), 3s' E UNE {t, L, g) 
such that a = g(s'» can be done in the same way as in Proposition 1, using 
'truth-t<:lling' strategies. The second part of the proof (Le. If s' E UNE (t, L, g) 
then g(s') E 7(t», can be proved by noting that UNE(t, L, g) r;, B(L, g, p, t) 
Vp, t. Therefore g(UNE{t, L, g»r;,g(B(L, g, p, t». By Proposition 1, 
g(B(L, g, p, t» r;,,ST{t) and this proves the claim .• 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we have shown that under sorne assumptions - inc\uding private 
values and that a most preferred element in the set of social altematives exists for 
every agent - the existence of complete information inside islands guarantees the 
existence of a Robust Mechanism relative to any SCC satisfying the well-known 
conditions of monotonicity and no-veto power. Therefore, under our assumptions, 
the sufficient conditions for implementation in Nash Equilibrium tum out to be 
sufficient for implementation under Uniform Nash and Bayesian Equilibria as 
well. This means that if No-Veto Power is guaranteed, we can achieve the same 
altematives under complete and incomplete information. This is basically due to 
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the fact that in our case, information is not exclusive (see Palfrey-Srivastava 
(1986) and Blume-Easley (1990)). 2 
Our result contrasts with that obtained by Ledyard (1978) about the impossibil-
ity of implementing with Bayesian Equilibrium for every prior a large class of 
SCC, and with the so-calIed 'incentive compatibility approach to organization 
design' in which the choice of the mechanism depends crucialIy on prior beliefs 
(see Ledyard (1987) p. 149 and also Mookherjee-Reichelstein (1989), p. 1). In 
this approach first best alternatives can not usualIy be achieved (see Harris-
Townsend (1981) pp. 36-7,53-4 and 58 for a discussion on ex-ante vs ex-post 
efficiency and prior-free mechanisms). Tberefore, the simplifications introduced in 
this paper must be judged with regard to the positive results which are achieved. 
We believe that the approach we have started in this paper can provide a new 
avenue of research by identifying conditions under which incomplete information 
reduces to complete information. Sorne progress in this direction has been made 
by Yamato (1991b). 
We finalIy remark on an interesting feature of our mechanism. If .'T is a 
function and the set of maximal elements is always a singleton, it can be shown 
that the strategies which are a Bayesian Equilibrium are (ex post) a Nash 
Equilibrium. Tberefore no agent will ever regret her choice. 
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